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abstract: there is no human right that has been as controversial as 
religious liberty. While it is but a consequence of the existing pluralism 
in society which today is recognised by the most advanced states and 
communities of states as forming the practical and theoretical basis 
for all political institutions, islamic countries still reject what they con-
sider simply a judeo-christian tradition; and the cairo declaration on 
Human rights in islam of 1990 subjects all the rights and freedoms 
stipulated in this declaration to the islamic sharia. 
the essential flaw of this position consists in that it regards religious 
liberty not a liberty of man but a liberty of truth. And since islam is 
considered to be the religion of true unspoiled nature it is concluded 
that there cannot exist any human right that is not supported by, or 
even runs counter to, islamic doctrine. Until this approach is overcome, 
there will not be true religious liberty in islamic countries.
that it is possible, for a religious community that claims to be the 
keeper of religious truth, to overcome such an approach has been 
demonstrated in an exemplary manner by the catholic church. Papal 
teaching and ecclesiastical doctrine before the second vatican council 
maintained a position not unsimilar to that of the cairo declaration, 
arguing that error cannot claim the same right as truth. it was only 
the council’s declaration on religious liberty Dignitatis humanae of 
1965 that brought about a radical change by recognising that religious 
liberty is a liberty of man deriving from his dignity as a free person and 
– as all human rights – not subject to any other restrictions than those 
which are necessary to protect the same rights and liberties of others. 
the position taken by the second vatican council can serve as a model 
for overcoming the traditional approach of religions and/or religious 
institutions and “religious” states towards freedom of religion.
Key words: cairo declaration on Human rights in islam; church and 
state; dignity of man; Dignitatis humanae; freedom of expression; free-
dom of religion; freedom of thought; human rights in catholic doctrine 
before and after vaticanum ii; human rights in islam; ius publicum ec-
clesiasticum; religion and the state; second vatican council, declara-
tion on religious freedom.
resumen: no hay un derecho humano que haya despertado tanta 
polémica como la libertad religiosa. los países islámicos aún la recha-
zan puesto que la consideran una simple tradición judeo-cristiana. en 
este sentido, la declaración de el cairo sobre los derechos Humanos 
de 1990 sujetó todos los derechos entonces reconocidos al respeto de 
la sharia islámica. 
en este artículo se criticará esta posición y se propondrá un enfoque 
distinto, basado sobre la aproximación que ha tenido hacia este 
tema la iglesia católica desde la declaración conciliar sobre la libertad 
religiosa «dignitatis Humanae», de 1965.
palabras clave: declaración de el cairo sobre derechos Humanos en 
el islam, la iglesia y el estado, dignidad del hombre, Dignitatis humanae, 
libertad de expresión, libertad religiosa, libertad de pensamiento, los 
derechos humanos en la doctrina católica, los derechos humanos en 
el islam; ecclesiasticum Ius publicum, la religión y el estado, el concilio 
vaticano ii, declaración sobre la libertad religiosa.
 * Paper presented to the International Conference on “Liberties in the new Europe” held in Ma-
drid, 8 and 9 April 2011, under the direction of Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Andrés Ollero Tassara, Chair 
of Legal Philosophy, and Prof. Dr. Cristina Hermida del Llano, Department of Public Law II, 
University Rey Juan Carlos Madrid.
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i. DiGnity oF mAn tHe bAsis oF HumAn riGHts
i f we accept that human rights are rooted in the dignity of man and if the dignity of man is based on, or even consist in, his being endowed with reason and free will, then the most fundamental human rights are those which relate 
to these human faculties. Man must be free to search for truth and man must be 
free to act according to his perception of truth.
The right of man to search for truth presupposes freedom of thought; 
and the right to hold a truth and to act according to one’s perception of truth 
presupposes freedom of conscience. Freedom of thought includes the right to 
form a view about (what is colloquially referred to as) “God and the World” 
and what is called in academic discussion the philosophy of life or, with a 
loan word taken from the German language, the Weltanschauung. And if this 
Weltanschauung is based on the belief in a numinous, it is commonly called 
religion. Freedom of thought and freedom of conscience therefore include 
freedom of religion; and freedom to hold a truth and freedom to act accord-
ingly include the right to free exercise of religion.
The fact that man is not an isolated being but a zóon politikón, an ens 
sociale, a social being, makes it necessary for him to communicate and to co-
operate with other human beings for the establishment of the common good. 
Communication is necessary not only for making cooperation more effective 
but also for clarifying the respective spheres of freedom in order to avoid that 
the freedom of the one is unduly curtailed by the unrestricted exercise of the 
freedom of the other. Freedom of thought and freedom to act according to 
one’s conscience include therefore the freedom of speech, including the free-
dom of all forms of expression 1. And freedom of Weltanschauung and religion 
includes the freedom to propagate one’s own belief and to preach one’s own 
faith.
Again, as a social being living in community with others, man has the 
right to exercise his religion not only in private and alone but also in public 
and in community with others. This right is but the social side of freedom of 
religion.
 1 E.g. freedom of press, of radio and television, and of the internet.
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ii. GrADuAl recoGnition oF FreeDom oF reliGion
Freedom of religion has been recognised in the early declarations of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, from the Virginia Declaration of Right of 1776 2 
and the American Bill of Rights of 1789/1791 3 to the Déclaration des droits de 
l’homme et du citoyen of 1789 4.
It has found its way into the different constitutions enacted in the course 
of the nineteenth and twentieth century 5. It has also been embodied in inter-
national instruments intended for the protection of human rights, especially in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 6 and in the United Nations 
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights of 1966 7, and, with regard to Europe, in 
 2 Section XVI provides: “That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner 
of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence; and 
therefore all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates 
of conscience; and that it is the mutual duty of all to practice Christian forbearance, love, and 
charity toward each other”. Cfr. tHorPe, F. n. (ed.), The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial 
Charters etc., vol. VII, Washington 1909, pp. 3812 et seqs. 
 3 Folwell, R. (ed.), The Laws of the United States, Philadelphia 1796. The so-called First Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution contains the establishment clause, the free exercise 
clause; freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly; and the right to petition. “Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise there-
of; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances”.
 4 Cfr. Article 10: “Nul ne doit être inquiété pour ses opinions, même religieuses, pourvu que 
leur manifestation ne trouble pas l’ordre public établi par la loi”. Cfr. also Article 11: “La libre 
communication des pensées et des opinions est un des droits les plus précieux de l’homme: tout 
citoyen peut donc parler, écrire, imprimer librement, sauf à répondre de l’abus de cette liberté 
dans les cas déterminés par la loi”. Article 
 5 Cfr., as an example, the Austrian Staatsgrundgesetz über die allgemeinen Rechte der Staats-
bürger of 1867, Articles 13, 14 and 15 and 16. Articles 15 and 16 distinguished between religious 
communities recognised by law and others, not recognised by law. While the Staatsgrundgesetz 
über die allgemeinen Rechte der Staatsbürger of 1867still forms part of the Austrian Constitu-
tion, Article 16 has been derogated by those international instruments binding upon Austria 
which grant the right to free exercise of religion, both in private and in public, to everyone. 
 6 General Assembly resolution 217 A (III), adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations 
on 10 December 1948. Cfr. Art. 18: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone 
or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teach-
ing, practice, worship and observance”. Cfr. also Art. 19: “Everyone has the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to 
seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers”.
 7 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A 
(XXI) of 16 December 1966. Cfr. Article 18:
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the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950 8, and the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights of the European Union of 2000/2009 9.
 Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include 
freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, obser-
vance, practice and teaching.
 No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or 
belief of his choice.
 Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed 
by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights 
and freedoms of others.
 The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, 
when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in 
conformity with their own convictions.
 Cfr. also Article 19:
 Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
 Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, re-
ceive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or 
in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
 The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and 
responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are 
provided by law and are necessary:
 For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
 For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals. 
 8 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, with Additional Pro-
tocols. The (so far) 15 Protocols open for signature [can be divided into two main groups: those 
adding additional rights to those protected by the convention and those concerning institutions and 
procedures for the international protection of the rights protected by the Convention’s system. Cfr. 
Articles 9 and 10.
 Art. 9. Freedom of thought, conscience and religion:
       Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom 
to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in 
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
       Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are pre-
scribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the 
protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others.
 Article 10. Freedom of expression
       Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opin-
ions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority 
and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of 
broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
       The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject 
to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary 
in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for 
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the 
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, 
or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 
9 EU OJ 2000/C 364/01. Cfr. Articles 1, 10 and 11.
 Article 1. Human dignity
       Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected.
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iii. FreeDom oF reliGion not oPPoseD to reAson AnD reliGion
If freedom of religion is rooted in the dignity of man and if the dignity of 
man is based on, or even consist in, his being endowed with reason and free 
will, than logic forbids to draw arguments from reason to abolish or curtail 
freedom of religion. What characterises the dignity of man cannot be used as 
an instrument against the consequences directly following from that dignity.
Moreover, logic forbids to invoke religion for the purpose of abolishing 
or curtailing freedom of religion. Where this is done, freedom of religion is 
not based on human dignity but on certain religious tenets which allegedly are 
based on a command of God. In such a case, full freedom of religion is granted 
only to the followers of the religion which proclaims these tenets, while the 
followers of all other religions enjoy (at the best) limited toleration.
iv. reliGious communities AnD tHeir APProAcH to FreeDom 
oF reliGion
Unfortunately, in the past as in the presence, arguments both from the sphere 
of reason and from the sphere of religion have been brought forward in order 
to deny or to curtail freedom of religion for others.
A. Islamic approach to freedom of religion
The rejection, by certain Islamic countries, of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights of 1948 as merely presenting a secular understanding of the 
 Article 10
       Freedom of thought, conscience and religion
       1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right includes free-
dom to change religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in 
public or in private, to manifest religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
       2. The right to conscientious objection is recognised, in accordance with the national laws govern-
ing the exercise of this right.
 Article 11
       Freedom of expression and information
       1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opin-
ions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and 
regardless of frontiers.
       2. The freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected.
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Judeo-Christian tradition and the allegation that Muslims could not conform 
to it without trespassing the Islamic law 10 shows that the prevailing Islamic 
concept of human rights is not based on the dignity of man but on Islamic 
law. This is confirmed by the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam 
of 1990 11, which subjects all rights and freedoms to the Islamic Shari’ah 12. As 
regards religious freedom, the Declaration states that “Islam is the religion 
of true unspoiled nature” 13. This gives Islam a privileged status 14, while the 
10 Cfr. the Statement of the Iranian representative, Said Rajaie-Khorassani, to the UN General 
Assembly’s Third Committee on 7 December 1984: “In his delegation’s view, the concept of 
human rights was not limited to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Man was of divine 
origin and human dignity could not be reduced to a series of secular norms [...] certain concepts 
contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights needed to be revised. [Iran] recog-
nized no authority or power but that of Almighty God and no legal tradition apart from Islamic 
law. As his delegation had already stated at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, con-
ventions, declarations and resolutions or decisions of international organizations, which were 
contrary to Islam had no validity in the Islamic Republic of Iran. [...] The Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, which represented a secular understanding of the Judeo-Christian tradition, 
could not be implemented by Muslims and did not accord with the system of values recognized 
by the Islamic Republic of Iran; his country would therefore not hesitate to violate its provisions, 
since it had to choose between violating the divine law of the country and violating secular con-
ventions”. UN Doc. A/C.3/39/SR.65, paras. 91-95. Cfr. also DAviD littmAn, Universal Hu-
man Rights and “Human Rights in Islam”, in Midstream (February/March 1999), also: http://
web.archive.org/web/20060501234759/http://my page.blue win.ch/ame land/Islam.html. 
11 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, Aug. 5, 1990, contained in: U.N. GAOR, World 
Conference on Human Rights., Fourth Session Agenda Item 5, U.N. Doc. 
 A/CONF.157/PC/62/Add.18 (1993) in an English translation. This Declaration also refers to 
the dignity of man but connects it with the “true religion”, i.e. Islam. Cfr. Article 1, lit.a: “All 
human beings form one family whose members are united by their subordination to Allah and 
descent from Adam. All men are equal in terms of basic human dignity and basic obligations 
and responsibilities, without any discrimination on the basis of race, colour, language, belief, 
sex, religion, political affiliation, social status or other considerations. The true religion is the 
guarantee for enhancing such dignity along the path to human integrity”.
12 Cfr. Article 24: “All the rights and freedoms stipulated in this Declaration are subject to the 
Islamic Shari’ah”. Cfr. also Article 25: “The Islamic Shari’ah is the only source of reference for 
the explanation or clarification of any of the articles of this Declaration”. The Cairo Declaration 
has been criticised not only for failing to guarantee freedom of religion, but also for failing to 
recognise full equality of men and women. 
13 Article 10.
14 This applies also and especially in the field of education. Cfr. Article 9: “(a) The seeking 
of knowledge is an obligation and provision of education is the duty of the society and the 
State. The State shall ensure the availability of ways and means to acquire education and shall 
guarantee its diversity in the interest of the society so as to enable man to be acquainted with the 
religion of Islam and uncover the secrets of the Universe for the benefit of mankind. (b) Every 
human being has a right to receive both religious and worldly education from the various in-
stitutions of teaching, education and guidance, including the family, the school, the university, 
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followers of other religions are only tolerated 15 and in the dissemination of 
their belief under a constant threat of prosecution 16, all the more so as free-
dom of expression is also subject to the “principles” 17 and “norms of Islamic 
Shari’ah” 18.
B. The Catholic Church’s approach to freedom of religion
The same position was –mutatis mutandis– maintained, up to the Second 
Vatican Council, in the teachings of the Catholic Church. This can be demon-
strated by a number of documents issued by various Popes in the nineteenth 19 
the media, etc., and in such an integrated and balanced manner that would develop human 
personality, strengthen man’s faith in Allah and promote man’s respect to and defence of both 
rights and obligations” (Italics supplied). 
15 This becomes clear if Article 18, lit. a (“Everyone shall have the right to live in security for 
himself, his religion, his dependents, his honour and his property”) is read in conjunction with 
the provisions of Article 10 and of Article 22, lit. c and d. 
16 Cfr. Article 10, second sentence: “It is prohibited to exercise any form of pressure on man or to 
exploit his poverty or ignorance in order to force him to change his religion to another religion 
or to atheism”. This can be easily applied to all situations where the propagation of faith goes 
together with educational, medical, or otherwise charitable work, as is the case, e.g., with many 
Christian mission establishments. Cfr. also Article 22, lit. c: “Information is a vital necessity to 
society. It may not be exploited or misused in such a way as may violate sanctities and the dignity 
of Prophets, undermine moral and ethical values or disintegrate, corrupt or harm society or 
weaken its faith”. It is a fact that today Christians are persecuted in many Islamic countries on 
the basis of laws that are inspired, or at least justified, by such kind of restrictions on freedom of 
expression. 
17 Cfr. Article 22, lit. a: “Everyone shall have the right to express his opinion freely in such manner 
as would not be contrary to the principles of the Shari’ah”.
18 Cfr. Article 22, lit. b: “Everyone shall have the right to advocate what is right, and propa-
gate what is good, and warn against what is wrong and evil according to the norms of Islamic 
Shari’ah”. 
19 It is not astonishing that the best collection of former illiberal teachings of the Popes can be 
found in in the works of those who reject Dignitatis humanae as a breach of the Church’s tradi-
tion. The following quotations are taken from the document “The Doctrinal Errors of Dignitatis 
Humanae”, issued by the sectarian “Traditional Catholic Religious Congregation of Mary Im-
maculate Queen (CMRI)”. Cfr., in particular, the Gregory’s XVI Encyclical Letter Mirari vos 
of 1832: “We come now to another cause, alas! all too fruitful of the deplorable ills which today 
afflict the Church. We mean indifferentism, or that widespread and dangerous opinion sown by 
the perfidy of the wicked, according to which it is possible, by the profession of some sort of faith, 
to procure the soul’s salvation, provided that one’s morals conform to the norms of justice and 
probity. From this poisoned source of indifferentism springs that false and absurd maxim, better 
termed the insanity [deliramentum], that liberty of conscience must be obtained and guaranteed 
for everyone. This is the most contagious of errors, which prepares the way for that absolute and 
Heribert Franz KoecK
148 PERSONA y DERECHO / VOL. 65 / 2011/2
and twentieth 20 century which relativise man’s liberty in favour of an objective 
truth. In order to avoid discussion on whether and to what extent these docu-
totally unrestrained liberty of opinions which, for the ruin of Church and State, is spreading eve-
rywhere and which certain men, through an excess of impudence, do not fear to put forward as 
advantageous to religion. Ah, ‘what more disastrous death for souls than the liberty of error,’ said 
St. Augustine”. Cfr. also Pius’ IX Encyclical Letter Quanta cura (1864); “Contrary to the teach-
ings of the Holy Scriptures, of the Church, and of the holy Fathers, these persons do not hesitate 
to assert that ‘the best condition of human society is that wherein no duty is recognized by the 
government of correcting, by enacted penalties, the violators of the Catholic religion, except when 
the maintenance of the public peace requires it.’ From this totally false notion of social govern-
ment, they fear not to uphold that erroneous opinion most pernicious to the Catholic Church, 
and to the salvation of souls, which was called by Our Predecessor, Gregory XVI (lately quoted) 
the insanity [deliramentum]: namely, ‘that the liberty of conscience and of worship is the peculiar 
(or inalienable) right of every man, which should be proclaimed by law, and that citizens have the 
right to all kinds of liberty, to be restrained by no law, whether ecclesiastical or civil, by which they 
may be enabled to manifest openly and publicly their ideas, by word of mouth, through the press, 
or by any other means.’” Cfr. also the attached Syllabus errorum 1864, which lists the following 
“errors”: “‘15. Every man is free to embrace and profess that religion which, guided by the light 
of reason, he shall consider true.’ ‘55. The Church ought to be separated from the State, and the 
State from the Church.’ ‘77. In the present day, it is no longer expedient that the Catholic religion 
should be held as the only religion of the State, to the exclusion of all other forms of worship.’ 
‘79. Moreover, it is false that the civil liberty of every form of worship, and the full power, given 
to all, of overtly and publicly manifesting any opinions whatsoever and thoughts, conduce more 
easily to corrupt the morals and minds of the people, and to propagate the pest of indifferentism.’” 
Cfr. also Leo’s XIII Encyclical Letter Libertas (1888): “... Civil society must acknowledge God as 
its Founder and Parent, and must obey and reverence His power and authority. Justice therefore 
forbids, and reason itself forbids, the State to be godless; or to adopt a line of action which would 
end in godlessness - namely, to treat the various religions (as they call them) alike, and to bestow 
upon them promiscuously equal rights and privileges”. 
20 Cfr. Pius’ X Encyclical Letter Pascendi Dominici Gregis, of 1907, with states with regard to the “Rela-
tion of Church and State”, describing the alleged errors of “modernists”: “Formerly it was possible 
to subordinate the temporal to the spiritual and to speak of some questions as mixed, conceding to 
the Church the position of queen and mistress in all such, because the Church was then regarded 
as having been instituted immediately by God as the author of the supernatural order. But this 
doctrine is today repudiated alike by philosophers and historians. The State must, therefore, be 
separated from the Church, and the Catholic from the citizen. Every Catholic, from the fact that he 
is also a citizen, has the right and the duty to work for the common good in the way he thinks best, 
without troubling himself about the authority of the Church, without paying any heed to its wishes, 
its counsels, its orders--nay, even in spite of its rebukes. For the Church to trace out and prescribe 
for the citizen any line of action, on any pretext whatsoever, is to be guilty of an abuse of authority, 
against which one is bound to protest with all one’s might. Venerable Brethren, the principles from 
which these doctrines spring have been solemnly condemned by Our predecessor, Pius VI, in his 
Apostolic Constitution Auctorem fidei”. Cfr. also Pius’ XII address to Catholic lawyers Ci Riesce 
(1953): “It must be clearly affirmed that no human authority, no State, no Community of States, of 
whatever religious character, can give a positive mandate or a positive authorization to teach or to 
do that which would be contrary to religious truth or moral good... Whatever does not respond to 
truth and the moral law has objectively no right to existence, nor to propaganda, nor to action”.
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ments are but unclear and mistakable answers to equally unclear and mistak-
able claims to freedom made at the time by various groups actually or alleg-
edly hostile to the Church, I leave them aside in this context and take up, in 
their place, the doctrine of the Ius publicum Ecclesiasticum as it was officially 
taught in Rome in the early nineteen sixties.
1.   The Church’s traditional approach as reflected in Ottaviani’s 
Ius Publicum Ecclesiasticum
And in order not to give anyone the chance to allege that I have singled 
out the obscure teachings of an obscure priest of no standing whatsoever, I shall 
concentrate on the Ius Publicum Ecclesiasticum written by Alfredo Ottaviani, 
an opus in two volumes the fourth edition of which appeared in 1958 and 1960, 
respectively, in the Vatican 21 as an official publication of the Pontificium Institu-
tum Utriusque Iuris. The author of this opus was no less a figure than a Cardinal 
of the Roman Church and the Prefect of the Holy Office (after the Council 
renamed the Congregation of the Faith) 22, and therefore himself a predecessor 
of the present Pope Benedict XVI in the latter’s former function 23.
The passages which interest in this context can be found in the second 
volume of Ottaviani’s opus which deals with the relationship between Church 
and State 24. In order to lay the basis for the further elaboration of this subject, 
Ottaviani addresses three principles which are, in his opinion, at the bottom 
of all misconceptions of Church-State relationship. These principles are: the 
principle of freedom of thought, the principle of freedom of speech, and the 
principle of freedom of worship.
(a)  No general freedom of thought
As regards freedom of thought, Ottaviani acknowledges that (and since he 
writes in Latin, I translate it for the benefit of all those who are not that conver-
21 AlAPHriDus ottAviAni, Ius Publicum Ecclesiasticum,4th ed., 2 vols., Vatican 1958 and 1960 (with 
the support of iosePHus DAmiziA).
22 Cfr. Gelmi, J., “Ottaviani”, in KAsPer, W. (ed.), Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche, 3rd ed., vol. 7, 
Freiburg-Basel-Rome-Vienna 1998, 1217 et seq., who characterises Ottaviani as the last great 
representative of the Ius Publicum Ecclesiasticum and the self-styled “custodian of the deposit 
of faith”.
23 Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger was 1981-2005 Prefect of the Congregation of the Faith.
24 Ecclesia et Status.
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sant in this old language) “the human intellect is by its very nature directed to 
the investigation of the unknown truth and to the amplification of knowledge”. 
But does this give man a right to freedom of thought? According to Ottaviani, 
“freedom of thought” and consequently “freedom of conscience in the specula-
tive field” as a general principle is a mere assertion of those adhering to (what 
Ottaviani considers to be the principal errors of) indifferentism and liberalism 25, 
which all are evils that either paved the way for, or are to be found in the wake of, 
the central error regarding the relationship between Church and State, which is 
secularism 26. The accent is not on man’s natural inclination to investigate as such, 
which would of course demand freedom of thought in the form of freedom of 
conscience in the speculative field; the accent is on investigation of the truth. If 
the human intellect “is deceived, and perceives something false, than it does not 
have the right and the competence to adhere to the misconception, and it does 
not have, therefore, the right to claim that others respect its way of thinking. 
The community is therefore not at all obliged to respect the opinions of all, 
even the contradictory and wrong ones, but has to take as a yardstick only truth 
and justice, and the legislator cannot be blamed to be partial if he denies to the 
error the rights conceded to the truth” 27.
Ottaviani thus distinguishes between a legitimate and an illegitimate use 
of man’s intellect: “The state of mind accepting the truth is legitimate, neces-
sary and to be respected; the state of the erring mind is illegitimate and must 
be dissipated, and, in particular, it may not claim rights in the social order, 
especially if it subtracts itself from its creator and negates that tribute of al-
legiance which the mind itself owes” 28.
(b)  No general freedom of speech
Ottaviani then turns to freedom of speech, including the freedom of the 
press. To him, freedom of speech is at least as objectionable, and probably 
25 AlAPHriDus ottAviAni, Institutiones Iuris Publici Ecclesiastici, Vol. II: Ecclesia et Status, 4th ed. 
(with the support of iosePHus DAmiziA), Rome 1960, pp. 50 et seqs. To these errors, Ottaviani 
also adds the atheism of the state (atheismus statalis), claiming that the State, as the organised 
form of society, is no less bound to venerate God than man as an individual (at p. 51), and natu-
ralism, by which he understands regard, by the State, only to that form of religion which is based 
on human reason rather than on revelation (at p. 51 et seqs.)
26 Ibid., p. 77 et seqs., et passim.
27 Ibid., p. 60. 
28 Ibid., p. 61.
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even more dangerous, than freedom of thought. This appears from the strong 
words used by Ottaviani with reference to freedom of speech which, “if un-
derstood in the secularist manner”, for him “is not less impious, wrong and 
absurd as the freedom of thought” 29.
That there cannot be a general freedom of speech already follows, ac-
cording to Ottaviani, from the obligation to embrace the truth and nothing 
but the truth. He states: “Since, namely, not everything is in itself true and 
decent, it is a duty not only to make right judgments but also, a fortiori, only 
to speak, defend and propagate what is right and true” 30. Thus, Ottaviani 
again distinguishes between what is legitimate and what is illegitimate; and 
any expression that does not communicate, defend and propagate what is 
right and true does not constitute a legitimate exercise of the freedom of 
speech.
Since man thus dos not enjoy freedom of speech unless used for the dis-
semination and propagation of truth, to Ottaviani “[i]t would be absurd to 
make it a duty of government to respect the freedom of speech and of writing 
even if they disseminate what is wrong and indecent: because this would be 
to the greatest detriment of the people, given the fact that men are usually 
given to wrong inclinations and are generally incapable to detect all the false 
dialectic allurements” 31.
(c)  No general freedom of religion and of worship
Ottaviani then turns to the freedom of religion; and since freedom of re-
ligious belief and freedom of religious preaching have already been taken care 
of under the headings of freedom of thought and freedom of speech he now 
deals more specifically with the freedom of worship.
Ottaviani first reports the position of his opponents (the “secularists”) 
who describe freedom of worship as “the right granted by the State to the 
individual citizens to worship God by external acts of his choice, so that all 
forms of worship should be publicly recognised as being on equalling footing 
with each other, so that none is given preference to the other, not even the 
catholic cult in societies consisting of catholic citizens. In this way, they say, 
29 Ibidem.
30 Ibidem.
31 Ibidem.
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the neutrality of the State in religious disputes has to be observed, so that the 
conscience of no citizen suffers coercion or offence” 32.
Ottaviani counters this argument by another which he used already to 
rebut an unlimited freedom of thought. 33 For Ottaviani, as we have seen, free-
dom of thought is limited to holding the objective truth; the mere personal 
conviction which deviates from objective truth is not protected. As regards 
freedom of worship, Ottaviani comes forward with an argument which is 
based on the logical principle of a fortiori: “[A]s in all things truth has to be 
sought, this applies first and foremost to divine things; and as it is unreason-
able to put the truth on equal footing with the error, it is also unreasonable to 
treat the true religion on par with the false ones” 34.
And since there thus is no subjective right to freedom of worship for 
the followers of false religions, there is also no obligation of the State to 
grant to them, in its legal order, such freedom of worship. Ottaviani even 
finds it appropriate to adduce arguments of convenience from ancient times. 
“[...] It is therefore not useful and reasonable to open up a free road for all 
cults; this only gives free entrance to dissension and civil strife. It is for 
this reason that the wise political direction of the Roman people is praised; 
because in religion there was to be observed what was already stated as law 
in the Twelve Tables: ‘No one may have separate Gods’ (‘[...] Gods of his 
own’). [...] And the Christian emperors saw to it that there was no place for 
heretic cults” 35.
According to Ottaviani, there can be only two grounds on which a false 
cult can be tolerated; and those are the same grounds on which any evil has to 
be tolerated from time to time, namely, first, if it is not possible to suppress it, 
and, secondly, if suppressing it might cause an even greater evil. For Ottaviani, 
the only basis for tolerance is thus the impossibility or the inopportunity to 
be intolerant. Thus, it might be actually impossible or highly inopportune for 
a predominantly Catholic State to prohibit non-Catholic cults or even non-
Christian forms of worshipping, because this might give rise to internal unrest 
32 Ibidem.
33 Cfr. supra, at fn. 25 et seqs.
34 ottAviAni, A., Institutiones Iuris Publici Ecclesiastici, Vol. II: EcclEsia Et status, 2nd ed. (with 
Iosephus Damizia), Rome 1960, p. 62.
35 Ibid., p. 62.
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and thus threaten public peace and good order, and because it might lead to 
reprisals directed against Catholics in foreign countries.
(d)   Excursus. Concordats as instruments of curtailing general 
religious freedom
The Holy See has always sought to insert, in concordats with so-called 
Catholic countries, provisions to the effect that the Catholic Church was 
granted rights as far-reaching as possible, while at the same time the State was 
obliged to curtail the freedoms of other religions, both Christian and non-
Christian, as much as possible. The last concordat concluded on these lines 
was the Concordat with Spain in 1953 36.
2.  The approach taken by the Second Vatican Council
The approach taken to religious freedom by the Second Vatican Council 
has no similarity to the Church’s traditional position as reflected in Ottavi-
36 At the time, it was considered exemplary by the Roman Curia. Cfr. Gonzáles-novAlín, J. l., 
“Spanien, I. Kirchengeschichte, 4. Vom 17. Jahrhundert bis zum Vaticanum II”, in KAsPer, w. 
(ed.), Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche, 3rd ed., Vol. 9, Freiburg-Basel-Rome-Vienna 2000, 809 et 
seqs., at 810. The concordat’s most relevant provision in this context was
 Article I. “The Roman Apostolic Catholic Religion continues to be the sole religion of the 
Spanish nation and shall enjoy the rights and prerogatives which belong to it in accordance with 
divine law and canon law”. It had to be read in conjunction with the Final Protocol which pro-
vided: “At the time of signing the Concordat concluded today between the Holy See and Spain, 
the undersigned plenipotentiaries made, by mutual consent, the following declarations, which 
form an integral part of the said Concordat:
       Concerning article I:
       In national territory, the provisions of article 6 of the Fuero de los Españoles shall continue 
in force.
       As relates to the tolerance of non-Catholic cults, in the territories under Spanish sovereignty 
in Africa, the status quo shall be maintained.
 Article 6 of the Spaniards’ Charter (Fuero de los Españoles) provided:
       1) The profession and practice of the Catholic religion, which is that of the Spanish State, 
will enjoy official protection.
       2) No one shall be disturbed for his religious beliefs nor the private exercise of his religion. 
There is no authorization for external ceremonies or manifestations of other than those of 
the Catholic religion”.
       Cfr. also Article XXVI. “In all State or non-State centres of learning of any order or degree, teach-
ing shall be in accordance with the principles of the dogma and morality of the Catholic Church.
       Ordinaries shall freely exercise their mission of watchfulness over such centres of learning 
with respect to the purity of the faith, morals and religious education.
       Ordinaries may demand that books, publications and teaching materials contrary to Catholic 
dogma and morality should not be permitted or should be withdrawn”.
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ani’s Ius Publicum Ecclesiasticum of 1960. Only five years later, in 1965, the 
Council adopted the Declaration Dignitatis Humanae on Religious Freedom 37, 
which constitutes a volte-face diametrically opposed to the Church’s former 
teachings in this field.
(a)  The dignity of the human person
The Council itself explains this radical change of position by the progress 
of human insight. “A sense of the dignity of the human person has been im-
pressing itself more and more deeply on the consciousness of contemporary 
man, and the demand is increasingly made that men should act on their own 
judgment, enjoying and making use of a responsible freedom, not driven by 
coercion but motivated by a sense of duty” 38. This, of course, cannot remain 
without effects on the political legal order. Consequently, “[t]he demand is 
likewise made that constitutional limits should be set to the powers of govern-
ment, in order that there may be no encroachment on the rightful freedom of 
the person and of associations” 39. This applies also and especially with regard 
to “[r]eligious freedom, [...] which men demand as necessary to fulfil their 
duty to worship God, [and which] has to do with immunity from coercion in 
civil society” 40.
(b)  General freedom of religion
The Council than continues to expound the essence and the fundaments 
of religious freedom. “This Vatican Council declares that the human person 
has a right to religious freedom. This freedom means that all men are to be 
immune from coercion on the part of individuals or of social groups and of 
any human power, in such wise that no one is to be forced to act in a manner 
contrary to his own beliefs, whether privately or publicly, whether alone or in 
association with others [...]” 41.
“The Council further declares that the right to religious freedom has 
its foundation in the very dignity of the human person as this dignity is 
37 Acta Apostolicae Sedis 58 (1966), pp. 929 et ss.
38 Art. 1.
39 Ibidem.
40 Ibidem.
41 Art. 2.
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known through the revealed word of God and by reason itself. This right 
of the human person to religious freedom is to be recognized in the con-
stitutional law whereby society is governed and thus it is to become a civil 
right” 42.
(c)  General freedom of thought
The Council then affirms that “every man has the duty, and therefore 
the right, to seek the truth in matters religious in order that he may with pru-
dence form for himself right and true judgments of conscience, under use of 
all suitable means” 43. However, “[t]ruth [...] is to be sought after in a manner 
proper to the dignity of the human person and his social nature”. Therefore, 
the Council states that “‘[t]he inquiry is to be free’, it may be supported but 
not unduly influenced by others” 44.
(d)  General freedom of conscience
“Moreover, as the truth is discovered, it is by a personal assent that men 
are to adhere to it” according to the dictates of their conscience. “On his part, 
man perceives and acknowledges the imperatives of the divine law through 
the mediation of conscience. In all his activity a man is bound to follow his 
conscience in order that he may come to God, the end and purpose of life. It 
follows that he is not to be forced to act in manner contrary to his conscience. 
Nor, on the other hand, is he to be restrained from acting in accordance with 
his conscience, especially in matters religious. [... Moreover], [t]he social na-
ture of man [...] itself requires that he should give external expression to his 
internal acts of religion: that he should share with others in matters religious; 
that he should profess his religion in community. Injury therefore is done to 
the human person and to the very order established by God for human life, if 
the free exercise of religion is denied in society, provided just public order is 
observed”.
42 Art. 2.
43 Art. 3.
44 The Council names, as legitimate support in the quest of truth, “the aid of teaching or instruc-
tion, communication and dialogue, in the course of which men explain to one another the truth 
they have discovered, or think they have discovered, in order thus to assist one another in the 
quest for truth”. Art. 3.
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(e)  The temporal power enjoined from interfering
“There is a further consideration. The religious acts whereby men, in 
private and in public and out of a sense of personal conviction, direct their 
lives to God transcend by their very nature the order of terrestrial and tempo-
ral affairs. [...I]t would clearly transgress the limits set to [the temporal] power, 
were it to presume to command or inhibit acts that are religious” 45.
“The freedom or immunity from coercion in matters religious which 
is the endowment of persons as individuals is also to be recognized as their 
right when they act in community. [... R]eligious communities rightfully claim 
freedom in order that they may govern themselves according to their own 
norms, honour the Supreme Being in public worship, assist their members in 
the practice of the religious life, strengthen them by instruction, and promote 
institutions in which they may join together for the purpose of ordering their 
own lives in accordance with their religious principles”.
3. Objective truth versus dignity of man
If we compare the approach taken to freedom of religion by the Second 
Vatican Council to that taken by previous Public Ecclesiastical law of which 
Ottaviani’s opus is a quasi-authentic expression, the difference between the 
two is the different starting point.
(a)  Ottaviani’s starting point: objective truth
For Ottaviani, the starting point is the objective truth. Freedom of 
thought, freedom of conscience, freedom of speech and freedom of wor-
ship are all rights connected with the objective truth. The opposite of truth, 
whether it is called untruth, error or falsehood, does not entitle to freedom of 
thought, freedom of conscience, freedom of speech and freedom of worship. 
The classic formulation of this position is that “error cannot have the same 
right as truth”.
(b)  The Council’s starting point: dignity of man
For the Second Vatican Council, the starting point is the dignity of man. 
Because of this dignity, man is entitled to freedom of thought, freedom of 
45 Art. 3.
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conscience, freedom of speech and freedom of worship. Of course, man is un-
der an obligation to use these freedoms according to his conscience. But since 
only God, and not the State, can look into man’s heart, it is not for the State 
to decide whether a person makes right or wrong use of his freedoms. The 
Council thus stresses that “the right to religious freedom has its foundation 
not in the subjective disposition of the person, but in his very nature. In con-
sequence, the right to this immunity [from external interference] continues to 
exist even in those who do not live up to their obligation of seeking the truth 
and adhering to it and the exercise of this right is not to be impeded [...]” 46.
This change from (what we may call) the dignity of truth to the dignity of 
man as the starting point for freedom of religion is a truly paradigmatic one. 
It takes serious an essential aspect of the pluralistic society, namely that here 
on earth no one has been made judge over others in matters of conscience, not 
even the State (or, by the way, the Church). 47
v. Dignitatis humanaE – A lAnDmArK Decision 
oF eXemPlAry cHArActer
The fact that such a paradigmatic change was possible within five years only, 
albeit under favourable circumstances that helped to overcome the dogged 
opposition of the supporters of the former position, 48 is a token of hope for 
46 Art. 2.
47 The paradigmatic change brought about by Dignitatis humanae has made it the subject on on-
going controversy between those in the Catholic Church who regard it an inalienable token of 
liberty and those who consider it a surrender to relativism. Cfr. KwAsniewsKi, P. A., Dignitatis 
humane. Die Auslegungsprinzipien: “In der Geschichte der Kirche hat kein Lehrdokument bei 
seiner Auslegung so viele Kontroversen und so viel Widerspruch ausgelöst wie die Erklärung 
des Zweiten Vatikanischen Konzils über die Religionsfreiheit Dignitatis Humanae. Von einigen 
gepriesen als edelste Frucht des Konzils, von anderen verachtet als ein schändliches Abweichen 
von der vorkonziliaren Lehre, wurde sie in zahllosen Büchern und Artikeln rezensiert, analysi-
ert, kritisiert und verteidigt”. (“Never before in the history of the Church a magisterial docu-
ment has raised,I the course of interpretation, as the Declaration of the Second Vatican Council 
on Religious Freedom Dignitatis Humanae. Praised by some as the most noble fruit of the 
Council, despised by others as an ignominious deviation from theachings prior to the Council, 
it was reviewed, analysed, criticised and defended in countless books and articles”. [Author’s 
translation.]) See: http://www.kath-info.de/dignitatis.html
48 Cfr. PAvAn, P., “Einleitung und Kommentar zur Erklärung über die Religionsfreiheit”, in 
Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche, Das Zweite Vatikanische Konzil, Dokumente und Kommentare, 
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future developments in the field of human rights 49. The human right situation 
in the Islamic countries would radically change if it were recognised there, 
too, that human rights have their basis in human dignity and not in objective 
truth; and that it is not for society and the State, and not even for the autho-
rities of one or the other religion, to pass judgment on the use made by man 
of his liberty as long as he does not interfere with the corresponding liberty 
of others. Islamic Shari’ah would cease to be the yardstick for human rights; 
rather, human rights would become the yardstick for Islamic Shari’ah.
To accept this latter consequence might be the most difficult aspect of 
the paradigmatic change in question. But it is a consequence which affects all 
religions alike; they all will have to examine the compatibility of their rules 
with human rights. No religious community will be spared this self-examina-
tion. To bring one’s own rules in line with human rights is both a demand of 
justice and a question of credibility. And in the long run a question of survival, 
at least from a human perspective.
Vol. II, Freiburg 1967, pp. 703 et seqs. Cfr. also DAvies, m., The Second Vatican Council and 
Religious Liberty, Long Prairie, Minn., 1992. However, since the most conservative groupings in 
the Church do not want to accept that Dignitatis humanae presents a revolution of the Church’s 
teachings on human rights (a qualification made by Yves Congar) and since the Lefebvre move-
ment declared it to be heretic, some commentators have attempted to demonstrate that there 
is in fact no contradiction between Dignitatis humane and the papal statements on these issues 
made up to and in the nineteenth century. Any such attempt, however, is doomed to failure 
because it starts from a certain preconceived idea of the irreversibility of the Churc’s doctrine 
which in itself is not well founded and the character of which must be characterised as ideologi-
cal.
49 In the teachings of the Catholic Church, religious freedom now seems safely enshrined. “[...] 
Religious freedom, which is still at times limited or restricted, remains the premise and guar-
antee of all the freedoms that ensure the common good of individuals and peoples. It is to be 
hoped that authentic religious freedom will be granted to all people everywhere. The Church 
strives for this in all countries, especially in those with a Catholic majority, where she has greater 
influence. But it is not a question of the religion of the majority or the minority, but of an inal-
ienable right of each and every human person. On her part, the Church addresses people with 
full respect for their freedom. Her mission does not restrict freedom but rather promotes it. 
The Church proposes; she imposes nothing. She respects individuals and cultures, and she honours 
the sanctuary of conscience. [...]”. joHn PAul ii, Encyclical Letter Redemptoris missio of 12 July 
1990, AAS, vol. 83 (1991), pp. 249-340, nº 39. (Italics supplied).
